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A persistently troublesome question of increasing interest to
courts, attorneys, insurance companies, and perhaps the few
policyholders who have read their automobile insurance policies
is whether an award of punitive damages1 against an insured is
covered by a liability insurance policy. The question has been liti-
gated with surprising infrequency. A majority of the courts hold
that the language of the typical policy does obligate payment
of a judgment for punitive damages on the theory that such
coverage exists unless specifically excluded.2 A few courts,3
and the majority of writers who have commented on the
subject,4 support the opposite position on the ground that obli-
gating an insurance company to pay a judgment for punitive
damages violates public policy.
I. Tim NATUIx or PuwimvE DAAGEs
Compensatory damages are those intended to make the plain-
tiff whole, that is, to restore him in every way possible to the
position in which he would have been but for the conduct of
which he complains. Because compensatory damages are ordi-
1. The term punitive damages, as used in this note is synonymous with ex-
emplary damages, vindictive damages, and "smart money."
2. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Threshermen and Farmers' Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v.
Thornton, 244 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1957) ; General Cas. Co. of America v. Wood-
by, 238 F.2d 452 (6th Cir. 1956) ; Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Welfare Fin. Co., 75
F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 734 (1935) ; United States Fidelity
& Guar. Ins. Co. v. Janich, 3 F.R.D. 16 (S.D. Cal. 1943); Employers Ins. Co.
v. Brock, 233 Ala. 551, 172 So. 671 (1937); American Fidelity & Cas. Co. v.
Werfel, 231 Ala. 285, 164 So. 383 (1935); American Fidelity & Cas. Co. v.
Werfel, 230 Ala. 552, 162 So. 103 (1935); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Baker, 304
Ky. 296, 200 S.W.2d 757 (1947); Morrell v. Lalonde, 45 R.I. 112, 120 A. 435
(1923) ; Carroway v. Johnson, 245 S.C. 200, 139 S.E2d 908 (1965) ; Lazenby
v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964).
3. Northwestern Nat. Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962);
Universal Indem. Ins. Co. v. Tenery, 96 Colo. 10, 39 P.2d 776 (1934) ; Tedesco
v. Maryland Cas. Co., 127 Conn. 533, 18 A.2d 357 (1941) ; Nicholson v. Ameri-
can Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 177 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 1965) ; Crull v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d
17 (Mo. 1964).
4. H. OLEcK, DAMAGES TO PERSONS AND PROPERTY § 275c (1967); [here-
inafter cited as OLECK] ; Logan, Punitive Damages in Automobile Cases, 1961
INS. L.J. 27; Note, Exemplary Damages in; the Law of Torts, 70 HARv. L. R1v.
517 (1957) ; Comment, Factors Affecting Punitive Damages, 7 MiAmi L. Q.
(1953); Comment, Insurer's Liability for Punitive Damages, 14 Mo. L. REv.
175 (1949) ; Note, Insurance Coverage and the Punitive Award in the Automno-
bile Accident Suit, 19 U. PITY. L. REv. 144 (1957); Comment, Punitive Dam-
ages and Their Possible Application in Automobile Accident Litigation, 46 VA.
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narily a prerequsite to the recovery of punitive damages,5 it
is assumed in the discussion that follows that the facts are such
that the compensatory damages are covered by the policy.
Punitive damages have become an accepted mechanism of
modern jurisprudence. Although it has been criticized,6 the
practice of awarding punitive damages is firmly established
in most jurisdictions.7 The prevailing view is that the dominant
function of an award of punitive damages is to punish the
defendant in order to deter repetition of the wrongful conduct."
Following this view, most commentators 9 think that public pol-
icy requires exclusion of such damages from liability insurance
coverage when they are assessed against the party personally
responsible for the wrong, since otherwise the wrong-doing
defendant is not punished.10
Not all states view punitive damages solely as punishment.
Oregon has construed punitive damages as serving the dual
role of both compensation and punishment.11 Mlichigan' 2 and
New Hampshire13 seem to share this view. Connecticut goes
even further and holds that what are called punitive damages
are in effect purely compensatory;14 they limit the amount of
a "punitive" award to the plaintiff's expenses of litigation in
the suit, less his taxable costs."5 Although it is well established
in South Carolina that punitive damages are regarded as a
punishment for wrong, there is language in some of the South
Carolina cases which suggests that punitive damages are not
5. E.g., Durham v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 208 F2d 342 (4th Cir. 1953) ;
Gomez v. Dykes, 89 Ariz. 171, 359 P.2d 760 (1961); Cook v. Atlantic Coast
Line R.R., 183 S.C. 279, 190 S.E. 923 (1937); Zedd v. Jenkins, 194 Va. 704,
74 S.E.2d 791 (1953).
6. C. McCoRa.cic, DAMAGES § 77 (1935).
7. Only four states absolutely reject the doctrine: Louisiana, Massachusetts,
Nebraska, and Washington. C. McCoRmIcK, DAMAGES § 78 (1935).
8. OLECKC, § 275A (1961).
9. Authorities cited note 4 supra.
10. See Oixcx, § 275C, at 560.6; Note, Insurance Coverage and the Punitive
Award in the Automobile Accident Suit, 19 U. PiTT. L. Rnv. 144, 154 (1957).
11. Kinzua Lumber Co. v. Daggett, 203 Ore. 585, 281 P.2d 221 (1955).
12. Wise v. Daniel, 221 Mich. 229, 190 N.W. 746 (1922).
13. Bruton v. Leavitt Stores Corp., 87 N.H. 304, 179 A. 185 (1935).
14. Chykirda v. Yanush, 131 Conn. 565, 41 A.2d 449 (1945); Armstrong v.
Dolge, 130 Conn. 516, 36 A.2d 24 (1944); Hanna v. Sweeney, 78 Conn. 492,
62 A. 785 (1906).
15. Cases cited note 14 supra.
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entirely separable in theory from actual damages and in fact
have a compensatory aspect.'
A claim for punitive damages gives the plaintiff a double-
barreled approach to possible recovery in that he usually alleges
compensatory damages and then adds an allegation to punish
the defendant. This provides a psychological means of satisfy-
ing the plaintiff's desire for retribution from the wrongdoer
in addition to a monetary return.
There is a lot to be said for punitive damages in this time
of flagrant negligence on the highways. Certainly the criminal
courts have not been altogether effective in the control of the
automobile traffic problems, and if punitive damages in an
automobile tort action can in any way help to alleviate this
problem they should have a place in our system.
I. Dcisioxs FAvoluNm CovEAGE
Of the cases which have squarely dealt with the issue, the
South Carolina case of Carroway v. Jo&nson 17 is the latest and
most representative of the decisions holding punitive damages
to be within policy coverage. In that case the plaintiff sued the
defendant for injuries sustained in an automobile collision
and was awarded a judgment in the amount of $5,000 actual
damages and $1,500 punitive damages. The insurer refused
to pay the judgment, and the plaintiff thereupon sued the de-
fendant and the insurer on the judgment. Upon a finding for
the plaintiff, the insurance company appealed, questioning its
liability for punitive damages. The policy contained the lan-
guage of the commonly used 1958 Family Auto Policy Standard
Provisions obligating the insurer "[t]o pay on behalf of the in-
sured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated
to pay as damages because of ... bodily injury ... sustained
by any person . . . arising out of the . . . use of the owned
automobile or any non-owned automobile."' 8 The Supreme Court
of South Carolina affirmed, holding that the language of the
policy was sufficiently broad to cover a judgment for punitive
damages, such judgment being included in the "sums" which
16. E.g., Hicks v. Herring, 246 S.C. 429, 144 S.E.2d 151 (1965); Rogers
v. Florence Printing Co., 233 S.C. 567, 196 S.E.2d 258 (1958); Daven-
port v. Woodside Cotton Mills Co., 225 S.C. 52, 80 S.E2d 740 (1954); Beaufort
v. Southern R.R., 69 S.C. 160, 48 S.E. 104 (1904).
17. 245 S.C. 200, 139 S.E2d 908 (1965).
18. Id. at 202, 139 S.E.2d at 909.
NoTs19681
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the insured had legally obligated itself to pay within the mean-
ing of the policy. The court said that "[1liability policies have
been held to cover punitive, as well as compensatory damages"19
and that the "majority of courts . . . have imposed liability
upon the insurer even though the recovery was based upon
wilful or wanton conduct [as distinguished from intentional
wrong doing], or even though the verdict may have included
punitive damages.1 20 According to the court, punitive damages
were included in the "sums" which the insured was "legally
obligated to pay" under the policy; therefore, the contract, con-
strued on its face, clearly encompassed punitive as well as com-
pensatory awards as "damages because of . . .bodily injury."
The court observed that insurance carriers have the right to
limit their liabilities and impose whatever conditions they
please so long as the limitations are not contrary to public
policy. Here, the insurance policy was a voluntary agreement
between the parties to pay "all sums," and the court felt that
such an agreement should be broadly interpreted."'
Of parenthetical interest is the fact that in Carroway the
court distinguished the case of Laird v. Nationwide Insuranoe
Company,22 in which it was held that when a South Carolina
statute28 required all policies to contain an uninsured-motorist
coverage clause, the coverage afforded thereunder was limited to
awards of compensatory damages only and did not include
punitive damages. That holding was, in turn, based on a dis-
tinction between the language of the South Carolina statute2 4
setting forth the general requirements of liability policies as
opposed to the specific language of the statute requiring un-
insured motorist coverage.
25
Shortly after the action in Carroway was instituted but before
the Supreme Court decision was rendered, the South Carolina
Legislature conclusively settled the issue in this state by amend-
ing the code to provide that "[diamages in an automobile
liability-insurance policy shall include both actual and punitive
19. Id. at 204, 139 S.E.2d at 910, quoting fron 8 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANcE
LAW AND PRACTICE § 4900 (1942).
20. Id. at 205, 139 S.E.2d at 910, quoting fron 7 J. APPLrmAN, supra note 19,
4312.
21. Carroway v. Johnson, 245 S.C. 200, 205, 139 S.E.2d 908, 910 (1965).
22. 243 S.C. 388, 134 S.E.2d 206 (1964).
23. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 46-750.14 (1962).
24. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-750.13 (1962).
25. Laird v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 243 S.C. 388, 134 S.E.2d 206 (1964).
[Vol. 20
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damages. 2 16 Since the legislature has acted, the public policy
argument cannot even be raised in South Carolina.
Construing policy language identical to that involved in
Carroway, the Tennessee Supreme Court similarly held in
favor of coverage for punitive damages in Lazenby v. UniversaZ
Underwriters Insurance Company.27 In Lazenby the insured,
who had an accident while driving in an intoxicated condition,
was protected by his liability policy for both compensatory
and punitive damages, and the policy as so construed was held not
to violate public policy.
The case most often cited for the proposition that an insurer
is liable for punitive damages is American Fidelity and C'asualty
Company v. WTerfel.21 In that case the complainant, having
been awarded a judgment including punitive damages against
the insured for injuries caused by his wilful or wanton conduct,
brought an action to reach the insurance money. The Alabama
court held that the policy language was broad enough to cover
personal injury or death resulting from an accident; therefore,
it was broad enough to cover punitive damages. It should be
noted, however, that under Alabama law only punitive damages
are recoverable in a wrongful death action.29
TheWerfel case has been followed by later Alabama cases.
In Employer's Insuranee Company v. Brock, 80 the court said
only that the punitive damages awarded fell within the terms
of the policy as construed in the Werfel case. Later in Capital
Motor Lines v. Loring3 l the Alabama court said, in answer to
the contention that the insurer was not liable for punitive
damages assessed under the homicide act, that "the damages
are not imposed to punish the indemnitor, and its liability to
pay such damages arises out of its voluntary obligation to pay
the judgment against the indemnitee."32
26. S.C. CODE: AxN. § 46-750.31(4) (Supp. 1966).
27. 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964).
28. 230 Ala. 552, 162 So. 103 (1935).
29. ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 123 (1958).
30. 233 Ala. 551, 172 So. 671 (1937).
31. 238 Ala. 260, 189 So. 897 (1939).
32. Id. at 263, 189 So. at 899. The Alabama cases have been described as
being "based not on legal reasoning but . .. the product of a peculiar statutory
scheme which would seem to have little application outside of Alabama." Note,
Insurance Coverage and the Punitive Award in the Automobile Accident Suit,
19 U. Pirr. L. REv. 144, 151 (1957). The Alabama cases are open to the ob-
jection that the decision is based on a section of the Alabama Code giving judg-
ment creditors of an insured the right to have the insurance money provided
5
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A Federal court decision using Missouri law, Ohio Casualty
Inwuance Company v. WeZfare Finance Company 83 followed
this same line of reasoning. A liability policy insuring "against
loss by reason of bodily injuries.., accidentally sustained ...
by any person or persons other than employees of the assured"
8 4
was held to cover punitive damages recovered by a person who
had been injured by the defendant's truck. The court said:
The contention of appellant that exemplary damages are
outside of the language and meaning of the policy is not
well taken.... The basis of the.., action was negligence
and nothing more than negligence. Obviously, negligence
is covered in the term of the policy 'accidentally sustained.'
The assessment of punitive damages was a 'liability im-
posed by law upon the assured' in connection with and be-
cause of the bodily injuries and aggravated conduct of the
servant in causing such injuries. Under the Missouri law,
where injuries are negligently caused and the negligence
is of such an aggravated form or attended by such circum-
stances as to be wanton and reckless in character, puni-
tive damages are authorized....
Since this policy clearly covers bodily damage through
negligence and since these punitive damages are imposed
because of the aggravated circumstances or form of this
negligence, such punitive damages must be regarded as
coming within the meaning of the policy.8 5
The decision, while holding that the policy involved covered
punitive damages for gross negligence, pointed out that the
master was being held liable for such negligence on the part
of his servant, without direct or indirect violation on the master's
part, so that there could be no violation of public policy from
insurance protection of the master. There is dictum that there
would be a grave question of validity because of the public
policy argument if the insured's own actions were involved. This
case may thus be regarded as a bridge between the cases finding
coverage and those denying it.
for in the contract of insurance applied to the satisfaction of a judgment, which
was held to authorize the recovery by an injured party of punitive damages from
the insurance company apparently on the theory that the legislature had so
determined public policy by the passage of the statute. ALA. CODE tit. 28, §§ 11-
12 (1958).
33. 75 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 734 (1935).
34. Id. at 58.
35. Id. at 59.
[Vol.- 20
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NoTEs
Maryland Casualty Company v. Baker3" held that policies
issued to a taxicab operator covered a judgment rendered against
the operator in favor of a female passenger for both actual and
punitive damages because of an assault on her by the taxicab
driver. In United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company v.
Janieh37 the payment of punitive damages was held to be an
obligation under policy language agreeing "to pay on behalf
of the insured all sums which the insured shall become obligated
to pay by reason of liability imposed by law."3 8
The argument that punitive damages are not within the
policy provisions because they are actually not damages at all
but rather penalties was expressly rejected in General Casualty
Company v. Woodly 39 by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.
The policy in that case obligated the appellants "to pay on be-
half of the insured all sums which the insured shall become
obligated to pay by reason of the liability . . . imposed upon
him by law (a) for damages ... sustained... by any person
... .",40 The appellants contended that their liability policy did
not obligate them to pay that portion of the judgments award
as punitive damages, in that they were penalties rather than
damages. The court admitted that injuries inflicted intentionally
are not accidental injuries within the coverage of the usual lia-
bility policy but noted that injury from gross or wanton negli-
gence is not the same as intentional injury.41 The court, there-
fore, was of the opinion that the punitive damages awarded
were liabilities imposed by law for damages within the mean-
ing of the policy. It should be noted, however, that the reason
there is no coverage for intentionally inflicted injuries is that the
policy expressly excludes such injuries. In other words, the
absence of such coverage is not based on any punitive quality
in the damages for such injury. When there is no such policy
exclusion it has been held that there can be coverage even of
intentional injuries despite the argument that public policy
prevents any valid insurance against one's own intentional illegal
36. 403 Ky. 296, 200 S.W2d 757 (1947).
37. 3 F.R.D. 16 (S.D. Cal. 1944).
38. Id. at 19.
39. 238 F.2d 452 (6th Cir. 1956).
40. Id. at 457.
41. See Miller v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 291 Mass. 445, 197 N.E. 75 (1935);
Messersmith v. American Fidelity Co., 232 N.Y. 161, 133 N.E. 432 (1921);
Commonwealth Cas. Co. v. Headers, 118 Ohio St. 429, 161 N.E. 278 (1928).
19681
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acts.42 The majority of cases have held that an award of puni-
tive damages comes within the coverage of an automobile lia-
bility policy insuring against loss resulting from death or
bodily injuries, 43 and that such policies include recovery for
wilful or wanton misconduct.44 Almost all the cases holding the
insurer liable for punitive as well as compensatory damages have
been careful to note the distinction between wilful or wanton
misconduct and intentional misconduct.45 The view seems to be
that, although no person should be allowed to benefit from
or insure himself against liability for his own intentional wrong-
doings,46 there is nothing wrong with permitting him to insure
against his own negligent acts, however wanton or reckless they
may be. The law of insurance thus adopts the thin line between
gross negligence and intentional misconduct-almost always a
purely factual question for the jury's determination-as its test
of insurer liability.
In South Carolina punitive damages are allowed when there
is proof of wilful, reckless or malicious violation of a person's
rights ;47 and it must be more than "mere gross negligence.
48
The Fourth Circuit, declaring the rule of South Carolina, (a
rule which prevails in many other jurisdictions) has said that
"recklessness is the equivalent of ... intentional wrong."49 Such
expressions have led to the proposition that when the driver of
an automobile deliberately inflicts injury upon a person, it
should be regarded as an assault and battery and not an acci-
42. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Jones, 135 F.2d 191 (6th Cir. 1943).
43. E.g., United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Janich, 3 F.R.D. 16 (S.D.
Cal. 1943) ; Capital Motor Lines v. Loring, 238 Ala. 260, 189 So. 897 (1939) ;
Employers Ins. Co. v. Brock, 233 Ala. 551, 172 So. 671 (1937) ; see also 6 J.
APPLEUAN, INSURANcE LAW AND PRAcnIcz § 3997 (1945).
44. American Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Werfel, 230 Ala. 552, 162 So. 103 (1935)
45. E.g., Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers' Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Thorn-
ton, 244 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1957); General Cas. Co. of America v. Woodby,
238 F.2d 452 (6th Cir. 1956); New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Jones & Hines, 135
F.2d 191 (6th Cir. 1943); Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 214
Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964).
46. La Rocco v. New Jersey Mfrs. Indem. Ins. Co., 82 N.J. Super. 323, 197
A.2d 591 (1964); Messersmith v. American Fidelity Co., 232 N.Y. 161, 133
N.E. 432 (1921). Contra, Jernigan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 269 F.2d 353 (5th Cir.
1959).
47. Davenport v. Woodside Cotton Mills Co., 225 S.C. 52, 80 S.E2d 740
(1954); Darlington County Fair & Driving Ass'n v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.,
90 S.C. 436, 73 S.E. 790 (1912); Gwynn v. Citizens Tel. Co., 69 S.C. 434, 48
S.E. 460 (1904).
48. Hicks v. McCandlish, 221 S.C. 410, 70 S.E.2d 629 (1952).
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dent within the meaning of the policy. However, the Fourth
Circuit in Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers' Mutual Casu-
alty Company v. Thornton50 rejected the insurance carrier's
argument that prior South Carolina decisions had equated reck-
lessness with intentional wrong, policy coverage being limited
to negligent and unintentional acts. In holding that the policy
covered an award for punitive damages, the court concluded
that to sustain the carrier's position would "lead to the illogical
and indefensible result, contrary to the purpose and spirit of
liability insurance policies, which are designed to protect mem-
bers of the public, that the more extreme the recklessness the
more likely the insurer would be to escape liability."5' 1
III. D cisio s HouNG No Lun = IxsuRAxcE
CoVEAGE FOR PUNITV DAmAGEs
Perhaps the leading and best reasoned of the few cases deny-
ing coverage of punitive damages because of public policy is
Northwestern National Casualty Company v. MCNulty.52 The
insurer urged that a claim for punitive damages was not one
for "bodily injury" under coverage identical to that contained
in the 1958 Family Auto Policy Standard Provisions. (This is
the same policy language as interpreted in Carroway v. John-
son.58 ) The court for the Fifth Circuit found it unnecessary to
construe the insurance contract, holding merely that public policy
prohibits insurance against liability for punitive damages.54 The
court observed that
there are especially strong public policy reasons for not
allowing socially irresponsible automobile drivers to escape
the element of personal punishment in punitive damages
when they are guilty of wreckless slaughter or maiming on
the highway. It is no answer to say, society imposes criminal
sanctions to deter wrongdoers.... A criminal conviction and
payment of a fine to the state may be atonement to society
for the offender. But it may not have a sufficient effect
on the conduct of others to make the public policy in favor
of punitive damages useful and effective.... To make that
policy useful and effective the delinquent driver must not be
50. 244 F2d 823 (4th Cir. 1957).
51. Id. at 827.
52. 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962).
53. 245 S.C. 200, 139 S.E2d 908 (1965).
54. 307 F.2d 432, 434.
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allowed to receive a windfall at the expense of the purchasers
of insurance, transferring his responsibility for punitive dam-
ages to the very people-the driving public-to whom he
is a menace.15
The court also pointed out that if a culpable defendant is
permitted to shift the burden to an insurance company, puni-
tive damages would serve no socially useful purpose because
punitive damages do not compensate the plaintiff for his in-
jury."0 With almost unassailable logic, the court concluded that
because of the nature of punitive damages there is no point in
punishing the insurance company; it has committed no wrong.
Tedeso v. Maryland Camalty Company57 does not deal with
punitive damages as such, but rather with an award under
a Connecticut statute58 allowing double or treble damages for
torts resulting from wilful violation of traffic regulations. The
court held that an award of double damages under such a statute
was a penalty and that allowing a wrongdoer to protect him-
self against it by insurance would be contrary to public policy.
The court in effect equated the statute to one permitting re-
covery of a penalty (in the quasi-criminal sense) as opposed
to a punishment in the civil punitive damage sense. It was
accordingly held that the policy did not cover an award for
punitive damages on the theory that it would be contrary to
public policy to permit recovery from an insurer of amounts for
fines in criminal cases.
Universal Indemnity Insurance Company v. Tenery59 denied
coverage of punitive damages apparently upon grounds both
of the insurance policy construction and public policy.
The insurance company did not participate in this
wrong, and was under no contract to indemnify against
such. In this particular matter the policy indemnifies against
damages for bodily injuries, and nothing in addition is
contracted for, and there is no further liability. The injured
will not be allowed to collect from a nonparticipating
party for a wrong against the public.60
55. Id. at 441-42.
56. Id. at 442.
57. 127 Conn. 533, 18 A.2d 357 (1941).
58. Gan. STAT. CoNN. REv. § 14-295 (1958).
59. 96 Colo. 10, 39 P.2d 776 (1934).
60. Id. at 779.
[Vol, 20
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This nonparticipating party argument is one of the most
frequently cited and cogent arguments sustaining the position
The case of Crull v. GlebG is additional authority for the
that a policy should not cover a judgment for punitive damages.
proposition that the issues of construction of the contract and
public policy overlap.62 In denying coverage for punitive dam-
ages the court stated:
The chief purpose of punitive damages is punishment to
the offender, and a deterrent to similar conduct by others.
* . . This being true, it seems only just that the burden
of paying punitive damages should rest ultimately, as -well
as nominally, on the party who actually committed the
wrong. If the defendant Gleb was permitted to shift to
garnishee the burden of the punitive damage award, then
the award would have served no purpose. Plaintiff would
have already been made whole through his compensatory
damages, and the insurance company, which had done no
wrong, would be punished. There is no language in the
policy that provides for the payment of judgments for
punitive damages. The policy covers only damages for
bodily injury and property damage sustained by any per-
son. Punitive damages do not fall in this category.63
The most recent case denying coverage of punitive damages
because of public policy is NcVholson v. Amercean Fire & Casu-
alty Inwrance Company."4 In that case the Florida court
reached its decision solely on the grounds of public policy, rely-
ing heavily on McNulty.65 The court stated that "based on the
rationale of punitive damages, we are convinced that to allow
drivers of automobiles to shift the responsibility for this type
of penalty to an insurance company contravenes the public
policy of the state."66 The court also expressed its disagreement
with Appleman's statement that "it is clear that the average
insured contemplates protection against claims of any character
caused by his operation of an automobile, not intentionally in-
61. 382 S.W2d 17 (Mo. 1964).
62. See also Universal Indem. Ins. Co. v. Tenery, 96 Colo. 10, 39 P.2d 776
(1934).
63. Crull v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17, 23 (Mo. 1964).
64. 177 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 1965).
65. 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962).
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flicted.167 In response to this assertion the court stated: "We
believe that a person has no right to expect the law to allow
him to place responsibility for his reckless and wanton actions
on someone else.' 68
IV. CoNcLusIoN
While the majority of cases have found the insurer liable
for punitive damages, the majority of legal writers seem to
favor the opposite result on grounds of public policy. At first
blush it would seem that insurance against punitive damages
frustrates their purposes and should be considered contrary to
public policy. The majority opinion in MfNUity 69 cites a number
of articles, notes, and comments to this effect. On the other
hand, Appleman takes the contrary position concluding "that
the average insured contemplates protection against claims of
any character caused by his operation of an automobile, not
intentionally inflicted. °7 0 The majority of courts have agreed
with this view, and have imposed liability upon the insurer
even though the recovery was based upon wilful or wanton
conduct or even though the verdict may have included punitive
damages.
It is true that most of the cases allowing an injured party
to recover punitive damages from the wrongdoer's insurance
company do not discuss the public policy argument,7 1 but it does
not necessarily follow that they would have reached a con-
trary result upon express consideration of public policy. De-
termination of the true and proper public policy in this situa-
tion is not a simple matter, and as Judge Gervin's opinion in
the McNulty case indicates, there are many complicating in-
terests to be weighed.72 Since public policy embraces the princi-
ple that no person can lawfully do that which is injurious to the
public good, we must carefully weigh the validity of the in-
surance industry's arguments as they apply to the best interests
of the public.
67. 7 J. APPLEmAw, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTIcE § 4312 (1962).
68. Nicholson v. American Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 177 So. 2d 52, 54 (Fla.
1965).
69. Northwestern Natl Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962).
70. 7 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTIcE § 4312, at 77 (1962).
71. The one exception is Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 214
Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964), in which the Tennessee court through a con-
curring opinion by Justice White came to grips with the public policy argument
and concluded that it would not violate the public policy of Tennessee to hold
in favor of liability insurance coverage for punitive damages.
72. Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962).
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Insurer liability would cause difficulty at the trial with
respect to the introduction of evidence of the defendant's finan-
cial position and if juries attempt to get beyond insurance cover-
age to stick the wrong-doer himself, insurer liability may have
the effect of inflating punitive damage awards. On the other
hand, nonliability would produce a conflict of interests between
the insurer and the insured in settlement negotiations and trial
tactics, the insurer being principally interested in mnimzing
the claim for compensatory damages, and the insured in minimiz-
ing the punitive damages claim. Further difficulties would be
caused at the appellate level in those jurisdictions in which the
jury must return a lump-sum verdict.
The objection to most cases heretofore decided is not that they
have reached the wrong result but that they fail to give proper
consideration to all the relevant factors. As previously stated,
most of the cases holding the insurer liable for punitive damages
fail to discuss the public policy argument. On the other hand,
cases denying coverage of punitive damages on grounds of public
policy do not take into consideration the injured party to whom
the question of public good also applies. We should have in
the forefront of our minds the injured plaintiff, for whose
benefit compulsory insurance laws are passed, and from whose in-
jury the claim for damages, both compensatory and punitive,
arises. Public policy properly analyzed reveals that liability in-
surance is as much for the protection of the injured party as for
the protection of the insured.
There is often a fine line between simple negligence and
negligence upon which an award for punitive damages may be
made. This line is too thin and exacting to apply insurance
coverage in one case and deny it in the other.
The grounds on which the cases denying coverage of punitive
damages rest so heavily is that punitive damages are meant to
punish, and such punishment should fall on the guilty party,
not the innocent, nonparticipating insurance company. The logic
and validity of this argument is weak and indefensible. The
concern for not wanting to punish the insurance carrier, an
innocent party, is not logical since any insurance carrier's lia-
bility is determined by the contractual relationship of indemni-
fication.
The logic and validity of the public policy argument that to
require insurance companies to pay punitive damages would
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place a burden upon the insurance carrier and ultimately the
public itself is also without merit. Juries are never required
to give punitive damages and the overwhelming majority of
cases indicate that juries award punitive damages only when
the facts of the case indicate that they are well deserved. The
rapid rise in insurance rates certainly cannot be attributed to
the small number of cases in which insurance carriers have
been required to indemnify an insured for punitive damages.
There is no indication that denying insurance coverage for
punitive damages would deter wrongful conduct. It would
be pure speculation to conclude that the result of denying
coverage would be a reduction in accidents on the highways.
The issue of public policy boils down to which activity would
be better for the public good. Is society really protected when
insurance companies, no longer liable for punitive damages,
have less interest in preventing wanton acts? Allowing the
insurance carrier to escape payment of punitive damages under
the guise of public policy is acceptance of a doctrine that the
more extreme the recklessness the more likely the carrier to
escape liability.
If the insurance industry feels that punitive damages pro-
tection should not be afforded under automobile liability policies,
it can very easily make such an exclusion from the policy cover-
age.73 In the absence of such a specific exclusion, public policy,
properly analyzed, requires it to pay. In any event a court
should not aid an insurer which fails to exclude liability for
punitive damages. Surely there is nothing in the insuring clause
that would forewarn an insured that such was to be the result
of the policy language.
MIL~s LoADioLr
73. However this alternative of exclusion is not open to insurance companies
doing business in a state like South Carolina where by statute punitive damages
are included within policy coverage. This result is highly desirable since the
average policyholder believes the insurance company will pay all damages aris-
ing out of an accident for which he is held liable.
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